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Gary Becker’s theory of discrimination argues that increasing competition will reduce 
discrimination in the labor market. We use the Colombian trade liberalization episode over 
the period 1984–91 to investigate this claim on plant-level data in three ways. First, we 
examine whether women are concentrated in exporting plants. Second, we examine whether 
the increase in foreign competition due to unilateral trade liberalization disproportionately 
drove discriminating plants out of the market. Finally, we investigate whether trade 
liberalization affected hiring decisions (and thus gender segregation) by Colombian firms. 
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One of the main predictions of Gary Becker’s canonical model of discrimination (1957)
is that, as long as there are some potential employers with no taste for discrimination,
competitive forces will drive discriminating employers from the market in the long run.
Despite the fact that this is one of the strongest predictions of the Becker model, there
have been relatively few attempts to test this prediction. The few papers that have exam-
ined this hypothesis have produced conﬂicting ﬁndings, been limited to a speciﬁc sector,
or used measures that are imperfect proxies for competition. For example, Hellerstein,
Neumark, and Troske (2002) ﬁnd evidence that women are paid wages that are less than
their marginal product in sectors with a high degree of ﬁrm concentration (that is, only in
sectors where ﬁrms have some market power). However, they ﬁnd no evidence that these
potentially discriminating ﬁrms are more likely to exit the market. Black and Strahan
(2001) examine deregulation in the banking industry and ﬁnd that, after deregulation,
women’s relative wages increased, as did their share in managerial positions. Finally,
Black and Brainerd (2004) ﬁnd that increases in the import penetration ratio in a man-
ufacturing industry — their measure of competition — led to a fall in the gender wage
gap in the industry.
This paper makes three main contributions to the literature on competition and gen-
der discrimination. First, one interpretation of Becker’s prediction is that since exporting
ﬁrms face more competition than ﬁrms that produce only for the domestic market, ex-
porters should discriminate less than non-exporters. Previous studies of employment in
developing countries have typically found that women are concentrated in the export-
oriented industries of the manufacturing sector such as textiles and food products (e.g.,
Catagay and Berik (1991) and Ozler (2000)). However, it is diﬃcult to determine if this
female concentration is due to the exporting nature of those industries, or to some un-
observed industry characteristics. In this paper we investigate whether women are more
likely to be employed in exporting ﬁrms within an industry. Using Colombian manufac-
turing data we ﬁnd that this is the case: the female share of employment is higher among
exporting ﬁrms, and is increasing in the amount of exporting done by a ﬁrm.
Second, previous research on the eﬀects of foreign competition on gender discrimina-
tion has relied, almost exclusively, on household- or individual-level data, and has used
import penetration measures in a sector (i.e., the ratio of imports to domestic shipments)
to proxy for the degree of foreign competition, where increases in import penetration are
interpreted as reﬂecting increases in competitive pressures (e.g., see Berik, Rodgers, and
Zveglich (2004), Black and Brainerd (2004), Hazarika and Otero (2004) and Menon and
van der Meulen Rodgers (2009)).1 These previous studies have several limitations. First,
since workers cannot be directly linked to ﬁrms, the eﬀect of changes in competitive
pressures on the extent of labor market discrimination can only be inferred by examining
1Exceptions to this are the Black and Strahan (2001) paper, which uses regulatory changes in the
banking industry as a proxy for changes in the amount of competition in a sector, and the Hellerstein
et al. (2002) paper, which uses plant-level data.
1changes in the relative wages of workers in a sector. The primary implication of the
Becker model concerns the eﬀect of competition on ﬁrm hiring decisions: increases in
competition in a sector lead to the growth of less discriminatory ﬁrms which propor-
tionally hire more women. The impact on relative wages occurs indirectly through the
relative growth in demand for female workers, and need not occur at all if there are a
suﬃcient number of nondiscriminatory employers. Therefore, studies using worker-level
data cannot directly examine the main implications of the Becker model.
Another limitation of these previous studies is that the change in the import pen-
etration ratio in a sector is an imperfect proxy for the degree of competition in that
sector. In particular, in the absence of a change in trade ﬂows, a decrease in domestic
competition (resulting in a decrease in domestic production of the industry) would also
result in an increase in import penetration. As a result, changes in import penetration
do not necessarily reﬂect changes in competitive pressure.
In contrast to previous studies, we use plant-level data to directly examine the impact
of changes in the degree of competition on ﬁrm hiring decisions and we exploit a natural
experiment: the Colombian trade liberalization episode of 1984. Starting in 1985, and
following its entry into the GATT/WTO, Colombia undertook major unilateral trade
liberalization of its manufacturing sector. This liberalization entailed both a reduction
in the average level of protection, but also a collapsing of the distribution of protection as
Colombia moved to a more uniform tariﬀ structure. In this paper, we exploit this cross-
sectional variation in tariﬀ reductions to see if a greater increase in foreign competition
(i.e., a larger tariﬀ reduction) resulted in less gender discrimination across Colombian
ﬁrms. Both of these diﬀerences enable us to more directly examine the implications of
the Becker model.
Finally, the Becker model of competition and discrimination is commonly interpreted
as one where competition forces discriminating ﬁrms from the market. Firms that have a
“taste for discrimination” (i.e., place a negative valuation on hiring women) tend to have
higher costs and thus lower proﬁts than their less discriminating counterparts. To the
extent that capital investment will only ﬂow to the more proﬁtable (non-discriminating)
ﬁrms, competition will force the discriminating ﬁrms from the market in the long run.
Thus, the Becker model is commonly interpreted as one where competition reduces dis-
crimination in the long run through selection eﬀects (i.e., by forcing discriminating ﬁrms
to exit the market). However, as we show in a brief theoretical section, competition can
also reduce discrimination in the short run by increasing the marginal cost of discrimi-
nating behavior. That is, ﬁrms that perceive a tradeoﬀ between proﬁts and the female
share of their workforce would respond to increased competition by hiring more women.
Another advantage of the Colombian data is that it is plant-level, which allows us to
diﬀerentiate between these two forces and measure the extent to which increased foreign
competition induces discriminating plants (i.e., plants with low female shares) to exit
relative to the extent to which it induces all plants to increase the female share of their
labor force.
The primary conclusion of this paper is that increased competition reduces discrimi-
2nation by aﬀecting the hiring practices of ﬁrms. That is, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms in industries
that saw the greatest reduction in tariﬀs increased the female share of their work force
more than ﬁrms in industries that saw little or no reduction in tariﬀs. In contrast, we
ﬁnd little evidence that trade liberalization drove discriminating ﬁrms out of the market.
2 Gender Discrimination: Theory
In this section we present a model of competition and gender discrimination. We follow
Becker (1957) and Arrow (1973) in assuming that ﬁrms are not strictly proﬁt-maximizers
but rather maximize a utility function that evidences a tradeoﬀ between proﬁts and the
number of male and female employees. However, in contrast to Becker (1957) and Arrow
(1973), we explicitly assume a monopolistically competitive environment that allows both
discriminating and non-discriminating ﬁrms to coexist in equilibrium. The question of
interest is the eﬀect of an increase in competition on the equilibrium.
We assume an economy with two sectors: one sector consists of a numeraire good,
x0, while the other sector is characterized by diﬀerentiated products. The preferences of
a representative consumer are deﬁned by the following utility function:







where x0 is consumption of the numeraire good, y(j) represents consumption of brand
j of the diﬀerentiated product good and n represents the number of available varieties
(ﬁrms) in the diﬀerentiated product sector. Note that we adopt a CES speciﬁcation,
which reﬂects tastes for variety in consumption and also imposes a constant (and equal)
elasticity of substitution between every pair of goods. Indeed, it is straightforward to
show that with these preferences, the elasticity of substitution between any two products





where p(i) is the price of good i and E represents the total number of consumers in the
country.
We assume that production of the diﬀerentiated product good requires a sequence
of tasks to be performed (for example, in the automobile sector, one task might involve
installing the brakes and another task might be installing the windshield). This treatment
of production is similar to that of Becker and Murphy (1992) and Kremer (1993). Rather
than assuming a discrete set of tasks, it will be convenient to assume production is deﬁned
by the completion of a continuum of tasks along the unit interval. Letting t be the index
for tasks and letting the cost of task t be given by w(t), then the marginal cost of





We assume that either a male employee can be hired to complete a task at cost wm
or a female employee can be hired at cost wf where wm > wf (thus, we assume that male
and female employees are equally productive in producing the diﬀerentiated product, but
that there exists a wage diﬀerential in the economy).2 Deﬁning zi ∈ [0,1] as the fraction
of females employed by ﬁrm i, the marginal costs of ﬁrm i are given by:
ci = wm − zi(wm − wf) (4)
It should be clear that, given the existence of a wage diﬀerential, a cost-minimizing
ﬁrm will choose to hire only women (i.e., set zi = 1). However, as discussed previously,
we assume ﬁrms maximize a utility function that encompasses both proﬁts and a “taste
for discrimination,” which we capture by assuming that the ﬁrm owner/manager derives
extra disutility from hiring female workers, deﬁned by φi(zi). Note that we assume the
Arrow version of Becker’s model, in which ﬁrms care only about the fraction of their
workforce that is female (i.e., ﬁrms care about zi). Thus, ﬁrms choose price, pi, and the
female share of the labor-force, zi, to maximize:
max
pi,zi
(pi − ci)yi − φi(zi) (5)
where φ0
i(zi) > 0 and φ00
i(zi) < 0. From the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to pi,
















The left hand side of (7) represents the marginal cost to the ﬁrm of increasing the
female share of its employees while the right hand side represents the marginal beneﬁt
(in lower costs of production). Firms will choose to employ men (i.e., zi < 1) if and only
if the marginal disutility of hiring women is suﬃciently high (and outweighs the cost of
the wage diﬀerential).3
2This wage diﬀerential is simply taken as exogenous in the diﬀerentiated product sector. It can
be generated either by discrimination or productivity diﬀerences in the numeraire product sector. For
example, assuming each male employee can produce wm units of the numeraire good and each female
employee can produce wf units of the numeraire good, production of the numeraire good in positive
amounts would ﬁx wages in the economy at wm and wf respectively.
3There also exists a second-order condition on φ00
i (zi), which we assume is satisﬁed, that ensures an
interior solution.
4There are two items to note about the above derivations. First, ﬁrms with the greatest
“taste for discrimation” (i.e., with the highest values of φ0
i(zi) for any zi) will employ
the lowest share of female workers (i.e., choose the lowest zi). As in Becker (1957)
and Arrow (1973), the female share of the workforce will vary across ﬁrms, with more
discriminating ﬁrms employing a lower share of women and less discriminating ﬁrms
employing a higher share. In addition, the more discriminating ﬁrms, since they have
higher marginal costs of production (i.e., higher ci), will be less proﬁtable than the less
discriminating ﬁrms. As Becker (1957) and Arrow (1973) note, one would expect that, in
a competitive environment, capital would ﬂow to the more proﬁtable (less discriminating
ﬁrms) and in the long run the more discriminating ﬁrms would be pushed out of the
market. Thus, the traditional theory of discrimination argues that competition reduces
discrimination in the long run through a selection eﬀect where only the most proﬁtable
(least discriminating) ﬁrms survive.
However, these derivations suggest a second mechanism through which competition
can aﬀect discrimination: by aﬀecting ﬁrms’ hiring decisions (i.e., by aﬀecting the op-
timal choice of zi). For expositional simplicity, assume that ﬁrms are symmetric and
have identical utility functions (i.e., zi = z in equilibrium). In this case, the ﬁrst-order







[wm − (wm − wf)z]n
(8)
Now assume there is an exogenous increase in competition captured by an increase in
the elasticity of substitution, σ (note that as σ → ∞, the CES preferences take the linear
form: the goods become perfect substitutes and the market mimics perfect competition).







[wm − (wm − wf)z]n
> 0 (9)
An increase in competition will increase the marginal beneﬁt of employing more
women, increasing the female share of a ﬁrm’s workforce (i.e., increasing zi). This neg-
ative impact of competition on discrimination is due to an elasticity eﬀect: ﬁrms that
face a more elastic demand for their product will incur a higher cost to discriminating
behavior, as the resulting increase in costs and prices causes a correspondingly greater
loss of market share. To the extent that greater competition increases the elasticity of
demand for a ﬁrm’s product, such competition will increase the cost of discriminating
behavior resulting in the hiring of more female employees. Indeed, Krugman (1979) pro-
vides a model of monopolistic competition and international trade in which one of the
pro-competitive aspects of trade is that it increases the elasticity of demand faced by
ﬁrms.
However, one could also think of an increase in competition as an exogenous increase
in the number of ﬁrms in the market (perhaps due to a decline in entry costs). Taking a







[wm − (wm − wf)z]
< 0 (10)
In this case, an increase in competition (modeled as an exogenous increase in the
number of ﬁrms), will decrease the marginal beneﬁt of hiring women and so will decrease
the share of female employees (increase gender discrimination). This positive eﬀect of
competition on discrimination is due to a scale eﬀect: larger ﬁrms suﬀer a greater cost
to discriminating behavior since the increased marginal costs of production that result
from such behavior aﬀect a larger volume of production. To the extent that greater
competition reduces ﬁrm size, it might reduce the costs of discrimination and result in
the hiring of more male employees.
To summarize, the overall eﬀect of competition on discrimination reﬂects a combina-
tion of elasticity and scale eﬀects. Note that the force of these eﬀects depends partially
on the degree of existing competition in the market. For example, it is direct to derive
from the above calculation that the elasticity eﬀect is decreasing in σ (see equation (9))
and the scale eﬀect is increasing in σ (see equation (10)). Thus, in industries that are
already suﬃciently non-competitive (i.e., have a suﬃciently small σ), the elasticity eﬀect
will tend to dominate, and competition should reduce the degree of gender discrimina-
tion. This might not be the case in industries that are suﬃciently competitive (i.e., have
a suﬃciently large σ), where the scale eﬀect will tend to dominate. In other words,
the impact of competition on hiring decisions and the degree of gender discrimination
could be a function of the existing degree of competition in the industry.4 Some empir-
ical evidence for this conditional result can be found in Black and Brainerd (2004), in
which the impact of trade volume on gender wage diﬀerentials depends on the degree of
concentration of the industry.
3 Data: Colombian Trade Liberalization
In this paper we use plant-level panel data from Colombia to examine the prediction
of the Becker model that changes in the level of competition reduces discrimination
in the labor market. Like many developing countries, Colombia followed a policy of
import substitution in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s, this policy was reconsidered
as Colombia sought entry into the GATT. Starting in 1985 and culminating in 1991,
Colombia systematically lowered its trade barriers with the aim of creating a relatively
uniform structure of protection comparable to those in developed countries. Since high
tariﬀs shield domestic producers from competitive pressures from producers in other
countries, we treat changes in tariﬀs as changes in the level of competition faced by ﬁrms
in Colombia.
























Figure 1: Mean Tariﬀ by Year
This episode of trade liberalization has been extensively studied in the international
trade literature since several of its features make it attractive from an empirical stand-
point.5 First, prior to liberalization, Colombia had relied primarily on tariﬀs as a means
of trade protection and so the decline in tariﬀs was signiﬁcant (the average tariﬀ reduc-
tion was 31.4 percentage points between 1984 and 1991), and also provides an accurate
measure of the overall change in trade policy.6 Second, the Colombian trade liberalization
had a signiﬁcant impact on the structure of protection, with some industries receiving
extensive tariﬀ cuts while other industries were not signiﬁcantly aﬀected. It is this varia-
tion in tariﬀ reductions that we exploit in our empirics. Finally, the main policy objective
of the Colombian government was to achieve uniformity in tariﬀ levels across industries,
and to make their tariﬀ levels comparable to those of other WTO members as part of
Colombia’s entry into the GATT/WTO.7 Thus, the Colombian tariﬀ reductions were
5A partial list of international papers that have studied Colombia includes Roberts and Tybout (1997),
Fernandes (2007), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005), Brooks (2006) and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007).
6Unfortunately, while non-tariﬀ barriers were also reduced as part of the reform, complete data on
the reductions in such barriers is not available. However, as mentioned, tariﬀs were the primary policy
instrument and the available data suggests that tariﬀ levels (and changes) are positively correlated with
NTB levels (and changes) across industries in our dataset. See Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) for more
details.
7Colombia entered the GATT in 1981, but used developing-country exemptions to avoid tariﬀ reduc-
7Table 1: Summary Statistics
1984 1991 Change
Variable Mean (s.d.) Mean (s.d.) Mean (s.d.)
Female share, total 0.365 (0.286) 0.355 (0.265) 0.007 (0.145)
Female share, unskilled 0.341 (0.354) 0.314 (0.333) -0.005 (0.164)
Female share, skilled 0.497 (0.301) 0.504 (0.269) 0.024 (0.261)
Exports 0.018 (0.101) 0.042 (0.151)
Firm age 14.55 (12.23)
Employment (log) 3.55 (1.02) 3.34 (1.15)
Salary (log) 5.25 (0.43) 6.83 (0.46)
Skill ratio 0.213 (0.168) 0.269 (0.213)
Energy use (log) 2.67 (1.15) 4.65 (1.30)
Productivity (log) 6.31 (0.80) 8.19 (0.93)
Capital/labor (log) 4.94 (1.41) 6.58 (1.58)
Oﬃce equipment 0.083 (0.111) 0.094 (0.128)
Female management 0.202 (0.283) 0.237 (0.295)
Corporation 0.170 (0.376) 0.174 (0.379)
Proprietorship 0.139 (0.346) 0.123 (0.329)
Partnership 0.691 (0.462) 0.703 (0.457)
Tariﬀ 0.662 (0.328) 0.257 (0.088) -0.403 (0.269)
4-ﬁrm concentration 0.400 (0.192)
Observations 6,035 6,972 3,760
Notes to Table: See Appendix A for variable deﬁnitions. Changes are the average of the changes for
plants for which we have data in both 1984 and 1991.
less susceptible to industry pressure or governmental preferences, and can be plausibly
treated as exogenous. Evidence on both the decline in overall tariﬀs and the narrowing
of tariﬀ diﬀerences across sectors is provided in Figure 1, which shows the mean tariﬀ by
year across the plants in our sample. Note both the signiﬁcant average decline, and the
narrowing of the dispersion of tariﬀs.
All data come from a plant-level dataset produced from the Colombian Manufacturing
census by DANE (National Statistical Institute) for the years 1977 through 1991.8 This
tions until the trade liberalization episode studied in this paper. For an overview of the evolution of
trade policy in Colombia see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) and Fernandes (2007).
8We would like to thank Mark Roberts for making the Colombian manufacturing census data available
to us. For a complete description of all the variables used in our estimation, see the Appendix A, and
see Roberts (1996) for a description of this dataset.
8is an unbalanced panel covering industrial production in all 3-digit ISIC industries in
Colombia. For each year the survey collects data on production, sales, inputs, inventories,
exports and the industry code (4-digit ISIC) of each Colombian plant. It should be
noted that plants with less than 10 employees are included in the census prior to 1982,
but excluded after 1983 (although a small proportion are included following 1985). Our
sample includes a total of 6,035 plants in 1984; 3,760 remain in the sample in 1991, which
totals 6,972 plants.9 The Colombian manufacturing industry is characterized by relatively
small-scale plants (70% of production is by plants employing fewer than 50 workers), and
high levels of entry and exit (with average entry rates of 11% and exit rates of 10%).10
However, the distribution of plants across industries is relatively constant over time with
the major industries being food, apparel, textiles, printing and metal products. For
measures of trade liberalization, we employ ad-valorem tariﬀ levels and eﬀective rates of
protection that are available at the 4-digit ISIC level from the Departamento Nacional
de Planeaci´ on.11
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our data. Most of our analysis concentrates
on the change between 1984 and 1991, so Table 1 includes means for both years where
applicable, as well as the mean change in the relevant variables. Some trends stand
out: between 1984 and 1991, average tariﬀs dropped dramatically; exports (as a share of
production) increased; and plants became more productive, used more energy, and paid
higher wages.12 There was virtually no change, however, in the average female share
of total workers over this period, although the female share of skilled workers increased
slightly.
Since we are examining the female share of workers in Colombian plants, it is worth
brieﬂy discussing female labor force participation in Columbia more generally. Colombia’s
female labor force participation was higher than that of most Latin American countries:
in the early 1990s, it was 43%, approximately ten percentage points higher than the Latin
American average. This is generally attributed to more widely available contraception in
Colombia (between 1964 and 1994, fertility rates fell from 7.4 to 2.7 children per woman)
and very high violent crime rates for men, leading to a high probability of widowhood.13
In addition, between 1984 and 1991 female labor force participation rates rose fairly
dramatically, particularly for younger women (see Arango and Posada (2005a, 2005b)).
Female workers are, not surprisingly, concentrated in the apparel and textile industries;
in 1984, the female share of workers in these (4-digit) industries was as high as 80%,
relative to the overall average of 35%.
9In some of the analysis that follows, sample sizes are reduced due to missing data. In addition, we
drop approximately 2% of the sample classiﬁed as “other” types of enterprise (cooperatives, collectives,
etc.) in the analyses that follow.
10See Fernandes (2007).
11We would like to thank Jorge Garcia-Gracia at the World Bank for making these data available.
12All wages are measured in nominal dollars, so it is not surprising that wages rose over this period.
13“Women in Colombia Move to Job Forefront,” The New York Times, July 15, 1994.
94 Exports and the Female Labor Share of Colombian
Plants
As mentioned in the Introduction, one interpretation of exporting ﬁrms is that they
face higher degrees of competition than non-exporting ﬁrms, because they compete in
international markets. As a result, one might expect exporters to discriminate less than
non-exporters. Studies of employment in developing countries have typically found that
women are concentrated in the export-oriented industries of the manufacturing sector
(e.g., Catagay and Berik (1991) and Ozler (2000)), which typically includes the textile,
garment, electronics, leather and agricultural processing industries. However, it is dif-
ﬁcult to determine if this female concentration is due to the exporting nature of those
industries, or simply to unobserved industry characteristics. Indeed, Catagay and Berik
(1991) and Ozler (2000) also ﬁnd that women in developing countries are typically em-
ployed in low-paying, low capital-intensity, small-scale ﬁrms, hardly the standard charac-
teristics of exporting ﬁrms (see Roberts and Tybout (1997) for empirical evidence on the
types of ﬁrms that export). In this section, we investigate whether, in a given industry,
women are more likely to be employed by exporting ﬁrms.
Table 2 provides the results of a set of regressions where we regress the plant’s female
share of labor on a variety of plant-level characteristics (as well as 4-digit ISIC industry
ﬁxed eﬀects to control for industry-level characteristics and year dummies to control for
year eﬀects). The dependent variable in column 1 of table 2 is the female share of total
employment in the plant. As explanatory variables, we include the age of the plant, total
employment in the plant (to proxy for size), and productivity of the plant (value added
per employee). For this analysis, we use the full panel of ﬁrms from 1984 to 1991.14
Given that existing literature suggests that women are concentrated in low-paying jobs,
we include a measure of average wages of workers in the plant (the log of the total salary
and wages of all workers in the plant divided by total employment in the plant). As
additional explanatory variables, we include the energy share, capital share, skilled-labor
share (skilled workers out of total employment) and oﬃce equipment share of the plant
(as a measure of new technology used in the plant). Finally, the variable of interest is
the export intensity of the plant (plant exports as percentage of total sales).15
As can be seen from Table 2, plants that employ more women tend to pay lower wages
than the industry average. This result is consistent with our theoretical model, as well as
standard models of discrimination in Becker (1957) and Arrow (1973), where the beneﬁt
of hiring female workers is exactly that you can pay them lower wages. These results are
also consistent with work examining inter-ﬁrm segregation in the U.S. (i.e., Carrington
and Troske (1998) and Hellerstein et al. (2002)). However, also note that establishments
employing more women tend to be less capital- and energy-intensive, while establishments
that employ more women tend to have larger stocks of oﬃce equipment (as a share of
14We do not include plant-level ﬁxed eﬀects, since our interest is in the within-industry variation in
female share as a function of exports.
15Results are comparable with a dummy variable indicating exporting ﬁrms.
10Table 2: OLS: Which Firms are More Female?
(1) (2) (3)
Total Unskilled Skilled
Variable ˆ β (s.e.) ˆ β (s.e.) ˆ β (s.e.)
Exports 0.090 (0.014)∗∗∗ 0.109 (0.019)∗∗∗ -0.032 (0.016)∗∗
Firm age -0.0003 (0.000)∗ -0.001 (0.0002)∗∗∗ 0.0003 (0.000)
Employment (log) 0.012 (0.002)∗∗∗ 0.031 (0.003)∗∗∗ -0.071 (0.003)∗∗∗
Salary (log) -0.044 (0.005)∗∗∗ -0.018 (0.006)∗∗∗ -0.072 (0.008)∗∗∗
Skill ratio 0.053 (0.009)∗∗∗ -0.121 (0.014)∗∗∗ -0.300 (0.015)∗∗∗
Energy use (log) -0.013 (0.002)∗∗∗ -0.019 (0.002)∗∗∗ -0.010 (0.003)∗∗∗
Capital/labor (log) -0.007 (0.001)∗∗∗ -0.007 (0.002)∗∗∗ -0.001 (0.002)
Productivity (log) -0.005 (0.002)∗∗ -0.006 (0.003)∗∗ 0.015 (0.003)∗∗∗
Oﬃce equip 0.018 (0.014) 0.019 (0.019) 0.075 (0.021)∗∗∗
Female mgnt — 0.064 (0.007)∗∗∗ 0.014 (0.009)∗
Corporation -0.021 (0.005)∗∗∗ -0.025 (0.007)∗∗∗ 0.010 (0.006)
Proprietorship -0.018 (0.005)∗∗∗ -0.033 (0.006)∗∗∗ 0.030 (0.009)∗∗∗
Observations 53,497 52,228 49,065
Plants 10,933 10,798 10,144
Industries 96 96 95
R2 0.648 0.651 0.218
Notes to Table: The dependent variable is the plant’s female share of workers; annual data are pooled
1984-91. Time and industry ﬁxed eﬀects are included, and standard errors are clustered by plant.
See Appendix A for data deﬁnitions and notes.
“Total” includes owners and managers, in addition to skilled and unskilled workers, in the calculation
of the female share variable.
∗∗∗ indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 99% level or better; ∗∗ at 95%; and ∗ at 90%.
11total capital). Note that, as in Section 2, standard models of discrimination tend to
assume that male and female workers are perfect substitutes but that discrimination
results in female employees receiving a lower wage. The concentration of female workers
in certain types of plants (e.g., non-capital-intensive) suggests that male and female
employees might not be viewed as perfect substitutes, with female employees more likely
to be assigned to certain tasks. This could be due to productivity diﬀerences across
employees, leading women to have comparative advantage in certain jobs. Alternatively,
it could be due to the “taste for discrimination” diﬀering across jobs with plants being
more willing to hire women to complete certain tasks.
The picture that emerges from Table 2 of plants that employ a greater percentage of
women (less-capital/energy intensive, low-wage paying) is opposite the standard descrip-
tion of exporting ﬁrms in developing countries (e.g., see Roberts and Tybout (1997)).
Despite this, Column 1 of Table 2 suggests that exporting plants employ a larger share
of female employees. This result is at least consistent with the Becker hypothesis that
ﬁrms that face greater competition (in this case competing for proﬁts in foreign markets)
are also less likely to discriminate against women.
Since women tend to be concentrated in clerical occupations, which are classiﬁed as
skilled workers in these data, in regressions 2 and 3 of table 2, we present results when
the dependent variable is the female share of unskilled and skilled labor, respectively.
Note that regression 1 includes owners and managers, in addition to skilled and unskilled
workers, so regression 1 is not simply an average of regressions 2 and 3. In both regressions
2 and 3, we also add the female share of managers and owners, since women managers and
owners may have less taste for discrimination of female workers; this seems to be the case,
since in both regressions, the coeﬃcient estimate on female management share is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant. The results for the unskilled labor share (regression 2) are
quite similar to the overall sample: the coeﬃcient estimate on exports is quantitatively
very similar, and remains highly statistically signiﬁcant. The main change is that the
coeﬃcient estimate on the skill ratio is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting
that plants with proportionally fewer skilled workers tend to have higher female shares
of unskilled workers. Although this eﬀect does not show up in regression 1 for the total
female share, it ﬁts with the ﬁnding that women are concentrated in ﬁrms that are less
capital- and energy-intensive.
The results for the female share of skilled labor are also similar, with the notable
exception that the coeﬃcient estimate on exports is negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
This suggests that plants that export more — although they hire proportionally more
women overall, and proportionally more female unskilled workers — tend to have lower
female shares of skilled workers. One possible reason for this eﬀect is that exporting
plants tend to have multiple establishments with separate headquarters and production
facilities, and clerical workers are located in the headquarters, rather than in the plants
that appear in our data.
12Table 3: Industry Exit Rates 1984–91
(1)
Variable ˆ β (s.e.)
Exit rate 1977–81 0.076 (0.108)




Notes to Table: The dependent variable is the industry exit rate between 1984 and 1991. ∗∗∗ indicates
statistical signiﬁcance at the 99% level or better; ∗∗ at 95%; and ∗ at 90%. Mean probability of exit:
0.340 (0.163). 2 industries (3842, 3902) have all ﬁrms exit between 1984 and 1991.
5 Competition and Plant Exit
As mentioned previously, the argument made in Becker (1957) and Arrow (1973) was
that competition should reduce discrimination by inducing the exit of discriminating
ﬁrms (which would have higher costs and lower proﬁts than non-discriminating ﬁrms).
While this is primarily a long-run argument, our interest is whether we can observe this
eﬀect in the short run. That is, does an exogenous increase in the degree of foreign
competition (as we observe with the Colombian trade liberalization episode) induce dis-
criminating ﬁrms (i.e., ﬁrms with lower female shares) to exit the market? Indeed, the
recent literature on ﬁrm heterogeneity and trade stresses the ability of trade to improve
aggregate industry productivity through exactly such selection eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, trade
can induce productivity improvements by causing more productive ﬁrms to expand while
less productive ﬁrms shrink or exit the market (e.g., see Melitz (2003)). The obvious
parallel is the potential for trade competition to reduce discrimination by inducing dis-
criminating (i.e., less eﬃcient) ﬁrms to shrink or exit the market.16
In Table 3, we regress industry exit rates on the tariﬀ change induced by the Colom-
bian trade liberalization episode of 1984–91, as well as past exit rates to control for
industry-speciﬁc eﬀects. As can be seen, industries that experienced the most signiﬁ-
cant tariﬀ reductions (largest negative tariﬀ change) also saw higher exit rates, so the
increase in foreign competition does appear to have induced exit by Colombian ﬁrms.
The question of interest in this section is whether plants with low female shares are dis-
proportionately represented among these exiting plants. To investigate this question, we
run a logit regression predicting the probability of plant exit (between 1984 and 1991)
with the plant’s female share of its labor force as an explanatory variable. Results appear
in Table 4.
16It should be noted that these models of trade competition and productivity typically work through
the export side of the market. Thus, the parallel to the Colombian trade liberalization episode is not
direct, as unilateral trade liberalization in Melitz (2003) has no impact on the productivity distribution
of ﬁrms.
13Table 4: Logit: Probability of Firm Exit
(1) (2)
Variable ˆ β (s.e.) ˆ β (s.e.)
Female share 0.324 (0.143)∗∗ -0.234 (0.347)
Tariﬀ -0.007 (0.003)∗∗
Tariﬀ × female share 0.006 (0.005)
Exports 0.707 (0.297)∗∗
Years of existence -0.002 (0.003)
Total employment (log) -0.625 (0.042)∗∗∗
Salary (log) 0.015 (0.116)
Productivity (log) -0.474 (0.060)∗∗∗
Skill ratio -0.123 (0.206)
Energy use (log) -0.049 (0.035)
Capital-labor ratio (log) 0.026 (0.028)




Of which, exited 2,281 2,273
Log likelihood -3921.2 -3604.0
Notes to Table: The dependent variable is the probability that the plant exits between 1984 and 1991
(note: change in SIC not treated as exit).
All explanatory variables are measured in 1984. See Appendix A for data deﬁnitions.
3-digit industry dummy variables are also included in both regressions.
∗∗∗ indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 99% level or better; ∗∗ at 95%; and ∗ at 90%.
14In regression 1 of Table 4, we regress the probability of exit on the female share of the
labor force and include 3-digit SIC dummy variables. As can be seen, an establishment
with a higher female share was, on average, more likely to exit the industry between
1984 and 1991. Recall that women also tend to be concentrated in less capital-intensive,
low-wage plants so it is possible that women are overrepresented in exiting plants simply
due to the fact that they are concentrated in the types of plants that would be most likely
to exit. In regression 2 of Table 4 we include the vector of plant characteristics used in
Section 4, adding tariﬀs and an interaction term between tariﬀs and the female share.
As can be seen, controlling for other plant characteristics causes the coeﬃcient estimate
to become negative and no longer statistically signiﬁcant.17 It remains the case that we
fail to ﬁnd evidence for the proposition that an exogenous increase in competition drives
discriminating ﬁrms from the market, at least in the short run.
6 Competition and Firm Hiring Decisions
While the previous section fails to ﬁnd evidence that increased competition due to trade
liberalization forced discriminating plants from the market, a second possibility is that
the increase in foreign competition inﬂuenced plant hiring decisions. In this section,
we look for evidence that an exogenous increase in foreign competition induced plants
to increase the female share of their workforce. To investigate this question, we use
diﬀerences in the change in plants’ female labor shares between 1984 and 1991. 1984
corresponds to the high point of average protection in Colombia, while 1991 is the ﬁnal
year of data available to us. We regress this change in the female share on the tariﬀ change
in the industry.18 Thus, we are exploiting cross-sectional variation in the degree of trade
liberalization across industries to see if establishments in industries that experienced a
greater decline in tariﬀ protection responded by increasing the female share of their labor
force. To control for plant-level characteristics that might inﬂuence hiring decisions, we
include the female share of the plant in 1984. To control for industry-level characteristics,
we include 3-digit industry dummy variables.19 Results of this estimation are presented
in Table 5.
17Results are very similar for both subsamples when we estimate regression 2 on exporting and non-
exporting plants separately.
18For this analysis, our sample consists of plants that are in operation both in 1984 and 1991. One
possibility is that the change in female share is related to plant exit which, if true, would lead to a bias
in our estimated coeﬃcients. To investigate this possibility, we estimated a standard two-stage selection
model where the ﬁrst stage regression estimates the probability of plant exit. Since the results from the
two-stage model are largly identical to the results reported in Table 5, and since a standard Hausman
test fails to reject the hypothesis of no selection, we have chosen to report the results from the single
equation model. Results from the two-stage model are available from the authors on request.
19Note that the inclusion of the plant’s 1984 female share also partially corrects for censoring, in that
a ﬁrm with an already high female share (i.e., close to 1) cannot increase its female share further. Also
note that we can only include 3-digit industry dummies since our tariﬀ-change variable is at the 4-digit
level.
15Table 5: Effect of Tariff Change on Firms’ Female Share of Workers
(1) (2) (3)
Variable ˆ β (s.e.) ˆ β (s.e.) ˆ β (s.e.)
tariﬀ change 1984-91 -0.17 (0.02)∗∗∗ -0.16 (0.02)∗∗∗ -0.27 (0.04)∗∗∗
female share 1984 -0.33 (0.01)∗∗∗ -0.33 (0.01)∗∗∗ -0.33 (0.01)∗∗∗
4-ﬁrm concentration — 0.06 (0.02)∗∗∗ 0.14 (0.02)∗∗∗
tariﬀ chg*conc4 — — 0.26 (0.06)∗∗∗
corporation -0.02 (0.01)∗∗∗ -0.02 (0.01)∗∗∗ -0.02 (0.01)∗∗∗
proprietorship 0.01 (0.01)∗ 0.01 (0.01)∗ 0.01 (0.01)
Observations 3,763 3,763 3,763
R2 0.196 0.199 0.203
Notes to Table: The dependent variable is the change in the plant’s share of (total) female workers
between 1984 and 1991. 3-digit industry dummy variables are also included. (Tariﬀs and concentration
ratios are measured at the 4-digit industry level.) R2 does not include the eﬀects of the constant terms.
As can be seen from regression 1 of Table 5, an increase in foreign competition (as
captured by a decline in tariﬀ protection) is associated with plants increasing their share
of female employees. Recall that over this period, industries experienced (on average) a
signiﬁcant decrease in tariﬀs. Indeed, from Table 1, the average industry experienced a
tariﬀ change of -0.403, which corresponds to an increase in the female labor share of their
workforce of 0.069 relative to an industry which received no change in tariﬀ protection.20
As a point of comparison, the average female share in 1984 of ﬁrms in the dataset is
0.365, so an increase of 0.069 corresponds to an 18.9 percent increase in female share.
The Colombian trade liberalization episode appears to have had a signiﬁcant impact on
plants’ hiring decisions and women’s employment.
As discussed in the theoretical section, the eﬀect of competition on hiring could also
be a function of the existing degree of competition in the industry. To examine this
hypothesis, in the third speciﬁcation, we also include an interaction term between the
4-ﬁrm concentration of the industry and the tariﬀ change. Presumably, plants in more
concentrated industries face less competition and should be more aﬀected by any given
change in tariﬀs. The sign on the interaction term suggests that the marginal eﬀect of
a tariﬀ change on the female share is, somewhat surprisingly, lower in absolute value for
ﬁrms in more concentrated industries. Speciﬁcally, at the 25th percentile of concentration
(0.252) the marginal eﬀect of a tariﬀ change is -0.20, while at the 75th percentile (0.531),
it is only -0.13.
In Table 6, we present regression results examining the impact that tariﬀ changes have
on the female shares of skilled and unskilled workers in a plant. These results largely
mirror the results seen in Table 5, although tariﬀ changes appear to have a larger impact
20Of 92 4-digit industries in the sample, ﬁve actually received increases in tariﬀ protection over this
period.
16Table 6: Effect of Tariff Change on Firms’ Female Share by Skill Level
(1) (2)
Unskilled Workers Skilled Workers
Variable ˆ β (s.e.) ˆ β (s.e.)
tariﬀ change 1984-91 -0.37 (0.04)∗∗∗ -0.22 (0.06)∗∗∗
female share 1984 -0.29 (0.01)∗∗∗ -0.57 (0.01)∗∗∗
4-ﬁrm concentration 0.20 (0.03)∗∗∗ -0.01 (0.04)
tariﬀ chg*conc4 0.39 (0.07)∗∗∗ 0.03 (0.10)
corporation -0.02 (0.01)∗∗∗ -0.06 (0.01)∗∗∗
proprietorship -0.00 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01)∗∗∗
Observations 3,667 3,423
R2 0.185 0.337
Marginal eﬀect -0.21 (0.03)∗∗∗ -0.21 (0.04)∗∗∗
Notes to Table: The dependent variables are the change in the plant’s share of female unskilled and
skilled workers, respectively, between 1984 and 1991. 3-digit industry dummy variables are also
included. “Female share 1984” is the share of unskilled and skilled labor, respectively. Concentration is
at the 4-digit industry level.
“Marginal eﬀect” is the marginal eﬀect of a tariﬀ change evaluated at the median level of concentration
(0.387). R2 does not include the eﬀects of the constant terms.
on the female share of unskilled workers than on the female share of skilled workers.
However, the marginal eﬀect of a tariﬀ change evaluated at the median concentration
ratio (0.39) is identical for the two groups, at -0.21.
To further examine the hypothesis that the eﬀect of tariﬀs could vary by the degree of
competition in the industry prior to the tariﬀ change, in Table 7 we estimate the regression
from Table 6 separately by the exports status of plants in 1984. Since exporting plants
already compete in international markets, it seems plausible that a decline in domestic
tariﬀs would have a more signiﬁcant impact on the competition facing non-exporting
plants. Our results largely support this hypothesis. The last row of each panel includes
the marginal eﬀect evaluated at the mean of industry concentration. Looking at this row,
we see that the eﬀect of tariﬀ change is larger among non-exporting plants, particularly
in the case of skilled workers.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we exploit plant-level data to show that Colombia’s trade liberalization
episode between 1984 and 1991 resulted in proportionally more women being hired by
Colombian plants. This evidence is consistent with Becker’s theory of discrimination, as
well as with our slightly modiﬁed version of Becker’s theory. We also ﬁnd that this change
occurs more because increasing competition leads existing plants to hire more women (as
17Table 7: Effect of Tariff Change by Export Status
(1) (2) (3)
Exporting Firms Only
All Workers Unskilled Skilled
Variable ˆ β (s.e.) ˆ β (s.e.) ˆ β (s.e.)
tariﬀ change 1984-91 -0.36 (0.08)∗∗∗ -0.56 (0.10)∗∗∗ -0.07 (0.11)
female share 1984 -0.26 (0.03)∗∗∗ -0.22 (0.03)∗∗∗ -0.52 (0.04)∗∗∗
4-ﬁrm concentration 0.23 (0.05)∗∗∗ 0.35 (0.06)∗∗∗ -0.03 (0.07)
tariﬀ chg*conc4 0.42 (0.11)∗∗∗ 0.63 (0.14)∗∗∗ 0.01 (0.16)
corporation -0.02 (0.01)∗∗ -0.02 (0.01) -0.03 (0.02)∗∗
proprietorship 0.08 (0.04)∗∗ 0.06 (0.04) 0.13 (0.05)∗∗
Observations 519 518 511
R2 0.339 0.338 0.335
Marginal eﬀect -0.17 (0.05)∗∗∗ -0.28 (0.07)∗∗∗ -0.06 (0.08)
Non-exporting Firms Only
All Workers Unskilled Skilled
Variable ˆ β (s.e.) ˆ β (s.e.) ˆ β (s.e.)
tariﬀ change 1984-91 -0.26 (0.04)∗∗∗ -0.33 (0.05)∗∗∗ -0.20 (0.07)∗∗∗
female share 1984 -0.35 (0.01)∗∗∗ -0.29 (0.01)∗∗∗ -0.58 (0.02)∗∗∗
4-ﬁrm concentration 0.14 (0.03)∗∗∗ 0.19 (0.03)∗∗∗ -0.01 (0.05)
tariﬀ chg*conc4 0.23 (0.07)∗∗∗ 0.35 (0.08)∗∗∗ -0.04 (0.12)
corporation -0.02 (0.01)∗∗ -0.02 (0.01)∗∗∗ -0.06 (0.01)∗∗∗
proprietorship 0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01)∗∗∗
Observations 3,244 3,149 2,912
R2 0.205 0.182 0.345
Marginal eﬀect -0.18 (0.03)∗∗∗ -0.20 (0.03)∗∗∗ -0.22 (0.05)∗∗∗
Notes to Table: The dependent variable is the change in the plant’s share of (total) female workers
between 1984 and 1991. 3-digit industry dummy variables are also included. (Concentration is at the
4-digit industry level.)
“Marginal eﬀect” is the marginal eﬀect of a tariﬀ change evaluated at the median concentration ratio
(0.43 for exporting ﬁrms; 0.37 for non-exporters). R2 does not include the eﬀects of the constant terms.
18the cost of discriminating increases), rather than forcing them out of the market. The
eﬀect of tariﬀ liberalization on the female share of workers is quantitatively large: the
average decrease in tariﬀs over this period corresponds to a 6.9 percentage point increase
in the female share, relative to an industry with no change in tariﬀs. We are also able
to elaborate on earlier research that found that women are concentrated in exporting
industries, by showing that women are also concentrated in exporting plants. Finally,
we show that the eﬀect of tariﬀ liberalization is larger for non-exporting plants than for
plants that were exporting prior to liberalization — a ﬁnding that is consistent with the
prediction of our model that the impact of increasing competition will be greater for
ﬁrms that initially face little competitive pressure.
Importantly, our ﬁndings provide some evidence on how changes in competitive pres-
sure lead to less labor market discrimination and help resolve a puzzle in the existing liter-
ature. In Becker’s original model, competition leads to less discrimination by driving dis-
criminating ﬁrms from the market. However, despite evidence that discrimination leads
to lower wages and levels of employment for women and that discriminating ﬁrms earn
higher proﬁts (see Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (1999), Black and Strahan (2001),
Hellerstein et al. (2002), and Black and Brainerd (2004)) there is little evidence that
competition drives discriminating ﬁrms from the market (see Hellerstein et al. (2002)).
In our modiﬁed version of the Becker model, we show that increases in competition can
also reduce discrimination by raising the cost of discrimination, which pushes discrim-
inating employers to hire more women. Our evidence is consistent with this being the
primary mechanism through which competition leads to less discrimination. Thus, our
results provide new evidence about the importance of enhancing competition as a way
to reduce the extent of discrimination in the labor market.
19A Data
All data are taken from a plant-level dataset produced from the Colombian Manufac-
turing census by DANE (National Statistical Institute) for the years 1977 through 1991.
From 1983 on, the census covers industrial production for plants with greater than 10
employees. Our empirics concentrate on plants which were operating in both 1984 and
1991. For a thorough description of this dataset see Roberts (1996).
A.1 Variable Deﬁnitions and Notes
All variables are measured at the plant level unless otherwise noted.
Female share: female share of workers (total, unskilled, and skilled as described in text).
Productivity: value added for the plant divided by total employment.
Employment: total employment.
Firm Age: years since the plant’s establishment until 1984.
Exports: plant exports scaled by total sales.
Salary: total payroll divided by total employment.
Skill Ratio: share of skilled employment in skilled and unskilled employment.
Capital/Labor Ratio: ratio of ﬁxed capital to total employment. A small number of
plants with ﬁxed capital reported as zero are dropped. (In Table 4, for example, this
reduces the sample size by 23.)
Energy Use: one plus the ratio of energy consumed to total employment.
Oﬃce Equipment: oﬃce equipment’s share of total capital equipment.
Female Management: percentage of management and owners that is female.
Type of Enterprise: The data set classiﬁes plants by 10 diﬀerent enterprise types. We omit
ﬁrms classiﬁed as collectives, cooperatives, oﬃcial entities, and religious communities
(overall, these comprise less than 2% of the sample). We construct dummy variables for
Corporations (this includes plants classiﬁed as corporations, de facto corporations, and
joint stock companies), Proprietorships, and Partnerships (including limited partnerships
and joint partnerships).
Industry Tariﬀ : ad-valorem tariﬀ at the 4-digit ISIC level. Provided by Jorge Garcia at
the World Bank. The tariﬀ change for a 4-digit industry is simply the diﬀerence between
1991 and 1984 ad-valorem tariﬀs.
Industry Concentration: 4-ﬁrm concentration ratio for the 4-digit industry.
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